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ABSTRACT
The central question addressed in this collection is: in what circum-
stances did terrorism act as a “driver of history,” exerting a major
impact on international and national events, and why was it able to
do so? To answer this question, this article focuses on three levels of
analysis: first, using the assassination of the Archduke Franz
Ferdinand in 1914 as a case study, it explores terrorism’s monumen-
tal power to change the course of history. The second, which takes
as its reference point the case of the Fenian dynamiters’ campaign in
Britain during the 1880s, examines terrorism as a tactical weapon
that achieves profound changes in governmental organization and
policy to counter this menace. Finally, it discusses terrorism as a
strategic force, re-calibrating international politics and affairs, and
catapulting to prominence (and to an extent, power) hitherto
unknown or inconsequential movements, such as the Palestinian
fedayeen after the 1967 Six Day War. Each of these offers an impor-
tant lesson from the past for our understanding of terrorism today,
namely, how what may appear to be completely new and novel in the
present often has a significantly relevant historical precedent.
Indeed, all three cases presaged some later, important development
in terrorist tactics or strategy: in the first case, the emergence of
state-sponsored terrorism; in the second, attacks on subways (in
London) and other mass transit, that also led to the formation of new
security forces in response to the threat; and third, the “cult of the
insurgent” that has enormous resonance in Iraq, with bin Laden, and
in America’s war on terrorism today.
INTRODUCTION
Few subjects have generated more scholarly disdain than terrorism.
Professor Sir Michael Howard, the world’s preeminent authority on modern war-
fare,1 once described the study of terrorism as a “huge and ill-defined subject
[that] has probably been responsible for more incompetent and unnecessary
books than any other outside the field of sociology.  It attracts phoneys and ama-
teurs,” he railed nearly 30 years ago, “as a candle attracts moths.”2 His view was
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not entirely surprising given that most of the treatments of this subject at the time
were either anecdotal or, if within the academy, uselessly theoretical. It was thus
a field of study to which journalists and political scientists mostly seemed to
gravitate – with the resultant effect of producing a corpus of literature that was
ranged from the completely descriptive to the abstrusely definitional.  The intel-
lectually corrosive impact of these developments can be seen in an academic dis-
course that remained generally paralyzed for the succeeding three-plus decades
over the inability to define terrorism.  
Since 9/11, the debates over defining terrorism have been joined – or in
some cases, superseded – by the debate over root causes. Meanwhile, throughout
the pre-9/11 era, Osama bin Laden was steadily building the al-Qaeda movement
and preparing to unleash perhaps the greatest, and strategically most consequen-
tial, surprise attack in history. Indeed, while much attention has since rightly
focused on the intelligence failures that led to the tragic events of 11 September
2001, surprisingly little has been devoted to academic failures. Although these
were patently less consequential, they were no less significant: calling into ques-
tion the relevance of much of the scholarship on terrorism during the years lead-
ing up to 9/11. That bin Laden and al-Qaeda figured so inconspicuously in this
literature is a reflection not just of a failure to anticipate or interpret emerging
trends in terrorist violence but of an intellectual myopia that characterized the
field.  
Among the many criticisms that one can direct at the terrorism studies
field, its uni-disciplinary main orientation and domination by political scientists
is arguably neither unfair nor inaccurate. The disproportionate influence of envi-
able methodology, however divorced from actual knowledge of the subject, has
most recently been demonstrated by some of the recent research pertaining to
suicide terrorism. This work, while impressively solid methodologically,
nonetheless blunders toward patently suspect analytical conclusions. One might,
therefore, logically lament the dearth of empirically derived studies and in-depth
treatments that are the staples of the historian’s craft. Not that historians should
escape so lightly either. Just as many political scientists eschew or dismiss any
kind of policy-relevant work, historians themselves often resist applying their
analysis to real-world concerns. It was William Shakespeare, a mere dramatist,
after all, who famously wrote “What’s past is prologue,”3 and A.J.P. Taylor,
among the foremost historians of his day, who emphatically stressed that, “Study
of history enables us to understand the past; no more no less. Perhaps even this
is too high a claim.”4
But terrorism is not a subject that can be separated either from history
and/or from how it will play out in the future. The stakes are simply too great.
The clear transnational dimensions of the threat, its potential existential implica-
tions, and the declared intentions and well-documented efforts of some terrorist
groups to acquire chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN)
weapons indisputably pose new and increasingly formidable challenges to inter-
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national order, peace, and security, while emphasizing the critical importance of
multi-lateral cooperation. In the current situation, given this indisputably critical
exigency, and in the context of this collection, one must ask what has been the
strategic impact of terrorism. In what circumstances did it act as a “driver of his-
tory,” exerting a major impact on national and international events, and why? 
To answer this question, my article focuses on three levels of analysis:
first, terrorism’s monumental power to change the course of history – using the
assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 1914 as a case study. The sec-
ond examines terrorism as a tactical weapon that achieves profound changes in
governmental organization and policy to counter this menace – using the case of
the Fenian dynamiters’ campaign in Britain during the 1880s to illustrate this
point. Finally, I discuss terrorism as a strategic force, re-calibrating international
politics and affairs, and catapulting to prominence (and to an extent, power) hith-
erto unknown or inconsequential movements – such as the Palestinian fedayeen
after the 1967 Six Day War. Each has an important lesson from the past for our
understanding of terrorism today, namely, how what may appear to be complete-
ly new and novel often has a significantly relevant historical precedent – thus
contesting Taylor’s bold assertion above. Indeed, all these cases presaged some
later, important development in terrorist tactics or strategy: the emergence of
state-sponsored terrorism in the first case; attacks on subways (in London) and
other mass transit in the second case, that also led to the formation of new gov-
ernment organizations in response to the threat; and third, how the “cult of the
fedayeen” from 40 years ago has enormous resonance in Iraq, with bin Laden,
and in America’s war on terrorism today.
Changing the Course of History
The events immediately preceding the First World War in Bosnia – specif-
ically the assassination of the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo on
28 June 1914 – are, of course, familiar because of their subsequent cataclysmic
impact on world affairs. It was in Serbia and Bosnia that similar groups of disaf-
fected nationalists – Bosnian Serb intellectuals, university students, and even
schoolchildren, collectively known as Mlada Bosna (Young Bosnia) – rose up
against continued Habsburg suzerainty. While some historians have dismissed
the movement as comprised of “frustrated, poor, dreary and maladjusted”5 ado-
lescents (much as many contemporary observers similarly denigrate modern-day
terrorists as mindless, obsessive, and maladjusted), it was a member of Mlada
Bosna, Gavrilo Princip, who is widely credited with having set in motion the
chain of events that began with the assassination and culminated in the outbreak
of the First World War. Whatever its superficially juvenile characteristics, the
group was nonetheless passionately dedicated to the attainment of a federal
South Slav political entity (uniting Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs) and resolutely
committed to assassination as the vehicle for achieving that aim. Particularly sig-
nificant was the degree of involvement in, and external support provided to
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Mlada Bosna activities by various shadowy Serbian nationalist groups.  Principal
among these was the pan-Serb secret society, the Narodna Obrana (“The
People’s Defence” or ‘“National Defence”).
The Narodna Obrana had been formed in 1908 originally to promote Serb
cultural and national activities. It subsequently assumed a more subversive ori-
entation as the movement became increasingly involved with anti-Austrian activ-
ities, including terrorism, mostly in Bosnia and Hercegovina. Although the
Narodna Obrana’s pan-Serbian exclusionist aims clashed with Mlada Bosna’s
less parochial South Slav ideals, its leadership was quite happy to manipulate and
exploit the Bosnians’ youthful zeal and emotive nationalism for their own pur-
poses. To this end, the Narodna Obrana actively recruited, trained, and armed
young members from movements such as the Mlada Bosna, who were then
deployed in various seditious activities against the Habsburgs. As early as 1910,
a Hercegovinian youth, trained by a Serb army officer with close ties to the
Obrana had attempted to kill the governor of Bosnia. But, while the Obrana
included among its members senior Serbian government officials, it was not an
explicitly government-controlled or directly state-supported entity. Whatever
hazy government links it had were further and deliberately obscured when a rad-
ical faction left the Narodna Obrana in 1911 and established the Ujedinjenje ili
Smrt (The Union of Death or Unification or Death), more popularly known as the
Crna Ruka (the Black Hand). This more militant and much more clandestine
splinter group has been described by one historian as combining:
the more unattractive features of the anarchist cells of earlier years –
which had been responsible for quite a number of assassinations in
Europe and whose methods had a good deal of influence via the writ-
ings of Russian anarchists upon Serbian youth – and of the
[American] Ku Klux Klan.  There were gory rituals and oaths of loy-
alty, there were murders of backsliding members . . . identification of
members by number, there were distributions of guns and bombs.
And there was a steady traffic between Bosnia and Serbia.6
This group, which continued to maintain close links with its parent body,
was largely composed of serving Serbian military officers. It was led by
Lieutenant-Colonel Dragutin Dmitrievich (known by his pseudonym, Apis),
himself the chief of the Serbian general staff’s Intelligence Department. With this
key additional advantage of direct access to military armaments, intelligence,
and training facilities, the Black Hand effectively took charge of all Serb-backed
clandestine operations in Bosnia.7
Although there were obviously close links between the Serbian military,
Black Hand, and Mlada Bosna, it would be a mistake to regard the relationship
as one of direct control, much less outright manipulation. Clearly, the Serbian
government was well aware of the Black Hand’s objectives and violent means
the group employed in pursuit of them; indeed, the Serbian Crown Prince
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Alexander was one of the group’s benefactors. But this does not mean that the
Serbian government was necessarily as committed to war with Austria as the
Black Hand’s leaders were, or that it was prepared to countenance the group’s
more extreme plans for fomenting cross-border, anti-Habsburg terrorism. There
is some evidence to suggest that the Black Hand may have been trying to force
Austria’s hand against Serbia and thereby plunge both countries into war by
actively abetting Mlada Bosna’s plot to assassinate the archduke. Indeed, accord-
ing to one revisionist account of the events leading up to the murder, even though
the pistol used by Princip had been supplied by the Black Hand from a Serb mil-
itary armoury in Kragujevac, and even though Princip had been trained by the
Black Hand in Serbia before being smuggled back across the border for the
assassination, at the eleventh hour Dmitrievich had apparently bowed to intense
government pressure and tried to stop the assassination. According to this ver-
sion, Princip and his fellow conspirators would hear nothing of it and stubborn-
ly went ahead with their plans. Contrary to popular assumption, therefore, the
archduke’s assassination may not have been specifically ordered or even direct-
ly sanctioned by the Serbian government.8 However, the obscure links between
high government officials and their senior military commanders, and ostensibly
independent, transnational terrorist movements, and the tangled web of intrigue,
plots, clandestine arms provision and training, intelligence agents, and cross-
border sanctuary these relationships inevitably involved, have historical and cur-
rent relevance. They provide a pertinent historical parallel to the contemporary
phenomenon known as ‘state-sponsored’ terrorism (that is, the active and often
clandestine support, encouragement, and assistance provided by a foreign gov-
ernment to a terrorist group).9
Terrorism’s Tactical Resonance: The Fenian Dynamiters
Although Britain’s rule of Ireland already had a centuries-long history of
restiveness and rebellion, in the mid-nineteenth century the locus of revolution-
ary activities had expanded from Ireland to include the United States as well.
Among the mass of Irish emigrants that had fled the failure of successive potato
crops and resultant famine, were a group of radical nationalists who in 1858
founded a secret society called the Fenian Brotherhood. The Fenians and its
Ireland-based offshoot – the  Irish Revolutionary Brotherhood (IRB) – were at
once as daring and determined as they were impatient and incompetent. Their
motto, “revolution sooner or never,”10 accurately describes a string of half-baked
plots that included plans to kidnap the Prince of Wales,11 invade Canada, and
orchestrate a popular uprising in Ireland. So successful were British efforts to
penetrate the organization, and so abject was the failure of the Fenians’ grand
schemes, that the movement fell into disarray within a decade of its founding.12
But the Fenians’ unswerving commitment both to Irish republicanism and the use
of violence to attain it,13 created a legacy that subsequently inspired a new gen-
eration of US-based Irish revolutionaries.
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Thus, by 1873 a new organization, calling itself the Clan na Gael (United
Irishmen), had taken up the Fenians’ mantle. Its driving force was a firebrand
named Jeremiah O’Donovan Rossa. Sentenced to life imprisonment for sedition
in 1865, O’Donovan Rossa was released only six years later after a commission
of inquiry substantiated his claims of mistreatment. The abuse inflicted on
imprisoned terrorists like O’Donovan Rossa in the nineteenth century actually
bears a disquieting resemblance to the treatment reportedly meted out to some
detainees in the war on terrorism today.14 Not only was O’Donovan Rossa held
for over a month with his hands handcuffed behind his back, but he was also
“kept naked day and night” in a darkened cell and fed a meager ration of bread
and water.15 Exiled to the United States, O’Donovan Rossa quickly resumed his
subversive activities. He was assisted in these endeavours by Patrick Ford, the
editor of the Irish World, a newspaper that became the main platform for Clan na
Gael propaganda and incitement. Together, they developed a new strategy for the
republican movement. “We are not now advising a general insurrection,” Ford
explained in a 4 December 1875 column: 
On the contrary, we should oppose a general insurrection in Ireland
as untimely and ill advised. But we believe in action nonetheless.
The Irish cause requires Skirmishers. It requires a little band of
heroes who will initiate and keep up without intermission a guerrilla
warfare. . . .16
In words that accurately presaged the advent of a form of transnational ter-
rorism that has become a permanent fixture of our time, Ford also described how
these “Skirmishers” would “fly over land and sea like invisible beings – now
striking the enemy in Ireland, now in India, now in England itself as occasion
may present.”17
O’Donovan Rossa and Ford displayed an uncommon understanding of the
terrorist dynamic that went beyond even this early recognition of the media’s
power to amplify and communicate a violent message. Remarkably, both men
grasped that just as money lubricates commerce, a solid financial base is required
to sustain an effective terrorism campaign. It was thus not long before advertise-
ments began to appear in the Irish World soliciting contributions on behalf of a
“skirmisher fund.”18 By March 1877, $23,350 had been collected, a sum equiv-
alent to nearly half a million dollars in 2005.19 O’Donovan Rossa appears to have
also fully appreciated terrorism’s asymmetric virtues with regard to the dispro-
portionate economic losses and damage that could be inflicted on the enemy state
and the flood of contributions that a series of successful attacks might engender.
“England,” he explained in the Irish World, “will not know how or where she is
to be struck. A successful strike that will do her half a million dollars worth of
damage will bring us enough funds to carry on the work. . . .”20
Four years later, the Skirmishers commenced operations. On 14 January
1881, they bombed the Salford Infantry Barracks in Manchester. Their choice of
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target reflected yet another now-familiar pattern of contemporary terrorism:
attacks on buildings or other inanimate objects designed to commemorate and,
thereby draw attention to, some event of historic significance to the perpetrators.
In this instance, the Salford Barracks was where three Fenians – the so-called
‘Manchester Martyrs’ – had been hanged in 1867.  Up until this point, the Irish
terrorists seem to have differed only slightly from their Russian counterparts.
Both attacked targets symbolizing their enemy (inanimate objects in the case of
the Skirmishers and representatives of the Tsar by the Narodnaya Volya).  
Both also believed fervently in terrorism’s didactic potential, whether
directed toward the landless Irish or Russian peasant.21 But two years later, the
Irish campaign diverged significantly from the highly discriminate terrorism
practiced by Narodnaya Volya to something both more sinister and consequen-
tial. The principal weapons in the Russians’ campaign were the handgun and the
nineteenth-century equivalent of the hand grenade, employed in acts of individ-
ual assassination deliberately calculated to avoid death or injury to all but their
intended target. By comparison, the Skirmishers had already spilt innocent
blood; a seven-year-old boy had been killed and three other people injured in the
Salford Barracks blast.22 Still more innocent blood, however, was soon to be
shed. 
In 1883, the Clan na Gael and a re-branded IRB, now known as the Irish
Republican Brotherhood, formed a tactical alliance and together embarked on a
bombing campaign directed against the London Underground and mainline rail-
way stations both in the United Kingdom’s capital and other cities.23 The
bombers’ intention was not wantonly or deliberately to kill or harm innocent per-
sons but instead to throttle Britain’s economy and dramatically call attention to
themselves and their cause.24 However, their choice of both weapon (homemade
bombs consisting of gunpowder detonated by primitive time delay fuses) and tar-
get (locations in congested urban areas and public transportation) ensured that
the effects of their operations could neither be constrained nor controlled.  And,
while it is true that these bombings claimed the lives of fewer than a dozen
passersby or rail passengers, given that some of the explosive devices contained
over 20 pounds of commercial dynamite, this was more likely the result of luck
and happenstance than any effort on the part of the bombers to limit casualties
by timing or placement.25
The “dynamite campaign,” as this spasm of Victorian-era urban terrorism
came to be known, lasted until 1887.26 It spread beyond London to Liverpool and
Glasgow, before collapsing under the weight of intensified police surveillance,
heightened border and port control, the effective use of informants, and unprece-
dented national and even some international cooperation and liaison among hith-
erto entirely parochial law enforcement agencies. Indeed, the advances in police
investigative, intelligence, and pre-emptive operations necessitated by the bomb-
ings led that same year to the formal establishment of Scotland Yard’s famed
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Special Branch – the first such police unit dedicated specifically to political
crime and counterterrorism.27
More significant for our purposes, however, is the impact that nineteenth
century Irish political violence had on terrorism’s evolution and development. In
retrospect, patterns and modus operandi first appeared that would become stan-
dard terrorist operating procedures decades later. The Irish groups, for example,
were among the first to recognize the importance of establishing a foreign base
beyond the reach of their enemy, in order to better sustain and promote a pro-
tracted terrorist campaign. They were also ahead of their time in understanding
the value of such a sanctuary not only for planning and logistical purposes, but
also for the effective dissemination of propaganda and the critical solicitation of
operational funds.  Their use of time-delayed explosive devices so that the per-
petrator could easily effect escape and thereby ensure the terrorist campaign’s
sustainment, was another important innovation that became a standard feature of
twentieth-century terrorism. Finally, terrorist targeting of mass transport – and
especially subway systems – along with an almost callous, if not even casual, dis-
regard of innocent life have now become commonplace.  The 10 near-simulta-
neous bombings of commuter trains arriving at Madrid’s Atocha rail station in
March 2004, which killed 191 persons and wounded hundreds more, is an espe-
cially apposite, and tragic, example of contemporary emulation of the ‘Irish
model.’ “At the grand strategic level,” Lindsay Clutterbuck cogently notes, the
Clan na Gael’s and IRB’s
ideas enabled terrorism to move away from being a phenomenon
consisting of a single event, or at best a loosely connected series of
events, and to evolve into sustained campaigns underpinned by their
own well developed sense of timing and tempo. There was a quan-
tum leap beyond the limited aim of assassinating an individual to
achieve their objectives and into operational scenarios where terror-
ism could persist for years and encompass the deaths of thousands of
people.28
Strategic Impact: The “Cult of the Insurgent”
Iraq’s insurgents today can take great satisfaction from a job well done.29
They have imposed on that country a reign of terror that shows few signs of abat-
ing. They have inflicted a measure of pain and suffering on American military
forces that their larger, better trained, organized, and equipped conventional
counterparts had failed to achieve. They have frustrated the ambitions of a super-
power, and created doubt and uncertainty amongst it leaders and populace where
once confidence and certitude predominated. They have fractured Iraq’s already
fragile unity, sowing discord, and generating profound fears and anxieties that
have only deepened existing sectarian divisions. And, even if they are not clear-
ly winning, they don’t appear to be losing either: the fundamental metric of a suc-
cessful insurgency. But perhaps most significantly they have created and effec-
Hoffman  4/16/09  5:51 PM  Page 15
Winter 2007
16
tively fostered a “cult of the insurgent,” whereby their achievements are likely to
inspire emulation by other insurgent groups. Indeed, Iraq itself has not only
become a fulminate for continued radicalism and violence in that country and
elsewhere, but also a real-life training camp for jihadists and a laboratory for new
insurgent tactics and techniques to be exported elsewhere.  
To some extent, we have in fact seen it before – in the transformation of
the local conflict between Israel and the Palestinians nearly 40 years ago into the
first truly global terrorist phenomenon. In a striking parallel to contemporary
developments, a numerically inferior, modestly armed guerrilla movement
achieved world-renown in its conflict with the superior conventional military
forces of an established nation-state. Its actions in turn set in motion a chain of
events that led to the emergence of the modern age of international terrorism. The
genesis of this change was Israel’s lightning victory in the 1967 Six Day War,
known to Arabs as the “June War” or, more bluntly, as “The Setback.” As
Michael Oren wrote in the foreword to his magisterial Six Days of War:
The War of Attrition, the Yom Kippur, the Munich massacre and
Black September, the Lebanon War, the controversy over Jewish set-
tlements and the future of Jerusalem, the Camp David Accords, the
Oslo Accords, the Intifada – all were the result of six intense days in
the Middle East in June 1967. . . . In a very real sense, for statesmen
and diplomats and soldiers, the war has never ended.30
Indeed, few modern conflicts have been responsible for the kind of geopo-
litical tectonic shifts wrought by the Six Day War. In less than a week, a techno-
logically and doctrinally advanced, better trained, organized, and equipped Israel
Defence Force (IDF) negated the combined might and quickly vanquished the
massed armies of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. The rapidity and totality of the IDF’s
victory has never been matched. The closest contemporary equivalent is arguably
the March 2003 invasion of Iraq and the near bloodless capitulation of Baghdad
less than a month later. In the shame and humiliation that followed Israel’s aston-
ishing triumph, the only credible Arab military force left in the Middle East
seemed to be the Palestinian fedayeen (commandos; literally, “those who sacri-
fice themselves”).31 For years, their commanders had argued about the futility of
conventional military confrontation with Israel and had pressed for Arab support
of an intensified guerrilla campaign designed to sap the IDF’s strength, under-
mine national morale, and erode popular support and trust of Israel’s military and
political leaders.32 Al-Fatah, the guerrilla organization founded a decade earlier
and led by Yassir Arafat, and one of the member-groups of the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO), was an especially enthusiastic proponent of this
approach, which until this debacle had mostly fallen on deaf ears.33 Unsullied by
the defeat and humiliation that followed, the fedayeen’s arguments began to gain
greater credence in the war’s aftermath.34 Writing just a decade after these piv-
otal developments unfolded, Bard O’Neill reflected how, 
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The magnitude of defeat suffered by the Arab armies led Palestinian
leaders to once again question the feasibility of conventional combat
against Israeli forces.  The thought of a regular armed confrontation
with an enemy whose relative military strength had increased as a
result of the war seem ludicrous.  Minimally, such a course of action
would take many years of preparation, years that the new, more mil-
itant fedayeen leaders believed they could ill afford to lose.
Moreover, the Palestinians, along with many Arabs outside the
resistance movement, felt a strong psychological need to redeem
their wounded honor and dignity.  In a military-psychological setting
such as this, the renewed call for an active and immediate armed
struggle using unconventional techniques became an increasingly
attractive alternative strategy for many Arabs.35
Even more significant was the impact on the Palestinians themselves. Ever
since the Arab states’ defeat in the First Arab-Israeli War of 1948-49, they had
placed their faith in the hands of their neighboring Arab brethren who, they
believed, would one day surely re-group to destroy Israel and return the
Palestinians to their homes. The 1967 defeat convinced the Palestinians that
henceforth they must rely on no one but themselves if they were to ever reclaim
their lost country. Thus, the absence of any remaining conventional military
option combined with the fedayeen’s untarnished status to create a new, power-
ful force in Middle Eastern affairs.36 And, at the vanguard of this process were
Arafat and al-Fatah.37 In the aftermath of the debacle, Arafat adroitly maneu-
vered to exploit the fedayeen’s new-found prestige to re-order the Arab worlds’
priorities in the fight against Israel.38 True Arab unity, he declared, could not be
achieved until Palestine was liberated, and liberation could only be achieved
through irregular warfare and guerrilla attack.39 “This renewed sense of
Palestinian self-respect and determined activism,” William B. Quandt, one of the
era’s more astute observers of the Middle East and Palestinian affairs, argued in
a seminal 1973 study “contrasted with the low state of morale in other Arab
countries after the June defeat and provided a focus of political activity,” and
attendant support from socialist and capitalist Arab states alike throughout the
Middle East.40
Indeed, in the dismal post-war period many in the region also looked to
Arafat and the fedayeen with a revitalized sense of hope. Echoing the Egyptian
government’s official policy line, Cairo’s al-Ahram newspaper, for example,
confidently stated that from now on the fedayeen “shall make the lives of the so-
called victorious Israelis hell.”41 Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser wel-
comed the fedayeen’s rise to prominence “as one of the most healthy phenome-
na that came directly after defeat.”42 And Arafat himself declared in no uncer-
tain terms that “our hand will reach everywhere.  Not one Israeli will be able to
sleep in peace from now on.”43 The immediate result, however, was a series of
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mostly inconsequential guerrilla cross-border forays, consisting of the laying of
land-mines and salvos of mostly poorly aimed mortar and rocket fire that, while
incapable of decisively harming Israel, nonetheless had enormously significant
cathartic value both for the Palestinians themselves and for the rest of the Arab
world.44
What was still lacking, however, was a singularly dramatic turning point:
an heroic event that would incontestably elevate the fedayeen’s status to new lev-
els of prominence and entrench the power of the insurgent in the popular con-
sciousness of the time. The opportunity soon presented itself in a sharp, but in
military terms, otherwise unremarkable engagement that occurred in March 1968
at the Jordanian village of Karameh. 
As had occurred with unerring regularity since at least 1953, the level of
Palestinian marauding and harassment of Israel had continued to escalate to the
point where decisive Israeli military reprisal became inevitable. It was precisely
this cycle of raid and retaliation that had culminated both in the 1956 Suez crisis
and indeed the 1967 Six Day War as well.45 Less than a year later, the process
again played itself out in a by now familiar routine but, this time, with a distinctly
different outcome. The last straw for Israel in this latest series of provocations
was the landmine believed to have been laid by Fatah guerrillas on a road in the
Negev Desert. A bus carrying Israeli children from Tel Aviv on a school outing
had struck the mine, killing two children and wounding 28 more.  The IDF,
accordingly, was tasked with neutralizing the cross-border guerrilla threat by
striking at a known Fatah operations center based in Karameh. Journalist
Christopher Dobson, who chronicled the rise of Palestinian terrorism during this
period, recounted the somewhat unusual preparations surrounding the IDF oper-
ation:
The Israelis insist that this was not a punitive raid but was a pre-emp-
tive strike designed to prevent a large-scale campaign of terror
planned by Fatah. Whatever the reason, they were determined to
wipe out Karameh.  The operation was, however, out of the usual
Israeli context. There was no sudden-damn-the-consequence assault.
Instead, the Jordanians were warned beforehand not to interfere,
leaflets were dropped to the villagers telling them they would not be
harmed and the raiding troops were given strict orders not to harm
civilians or to fire at houses unless they were fired on.46
Indeed, according to Yezid Sayigh, who has written perhaps the most authorita-
tive study of the Palestinian struggle available in English, both the fedayeen who
were the targets of the impending Israeli assault and their Jordanian and Iraqi
army protectors, deployed in the hills above the village, and watched the IDF
preparations in plain view just across the Jordan River. With typical rhetorical
flair, Arafat dramatically resisted the entreaties of the local Jordanian command-
er and his counterpart in the Iraqi Expeditionary Force that earlier had deployed
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to the front-lines of the war on the Zionist enemy, to withdraw.  Setting the stage
for the propaganda triumph that would follow, Arafat reportedly rebuffed them
by declaring, “We want to persuade the world that there are those in the Arab
nation who will not withdraw and flee.  Let us die under the tracks of the tanks
and change the course of history in our region.”47
In a two-pronged “spoiling operation,” the IDF task force of armor and
heliborne paratroops struck at Karameh on 21 March 1968.48 The contrasting
Palestinian and Israeli accounts are instructive. Although they are at one with
respect to the outcome – and the propaganda windfall that the Palestinians reaped
– their narratives diverge sharply. Nonetheless, the point that facts are easily
embellished and spun, and that propaganda doesn’t necessarily have to be true to
be believed is all that really matters here. As Netanel Lorch, the Israeli soldier,
diplomat, and author, dryly recounted:
On 21 March 1968 Israel forces forded the Jordan River with the aim
of liquidating this terrorist base, the largest operation undertaken by
the I.D.F. since the [1967] war. Tanks, parachutists, artillery, engi-
neers and air force participated. The advancing forces crossed the
bridges at dawn, and liquidated the forward positions. Artillery
moved further east in order to isolate the battle area. The capture of
the village itself was the mission of a parachute unit, supported by
armor. An additional parachute unit, helicopter borne, blocked the
approach and escape routes to and from the village. The capture of
the village and the outlying camps was completed around 8 a.m., and
detained terrorists were being transferred into Israel. The disengage-
ment, however, took a number of hours until evening fell.
Resistance was stronger than had been expected. . . . The blow
inflicted on the terrorist base in Karameh forced Arafat to move his
base further east to a mountain area, and to disperse his forces fur-
ther away from the Jordan River.  It also served as a further demon-
stration to the Jordan government that in the absence of effective
counter-measures on its part, it might be the victim of the train of
events started by the terrorists.49
The Palestinian version of events, however, went something like this: 
Although the commandos, assisted by Jordanian forces, were out-
numbered and suffered heavy casualties, they inflicted severe losses
on the Israeli forces and were able to force the invaders to retreat.
Pictures in newspapers and on television screens of burnt our Israeli
tanks and captured Israeli soldiers gave the commandos a major
boost. Just months after Israel defeated the combined forces of
Jordan, Syria and Egypt, a few armed commandos were able to
inflict damage and ‘defeat’ Israel in battle.  Although hardly a mili-
tary victory, the battle of Karameh was a major psychic victory for
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the notion of armed struggle.  The ranks of the commandos swelled
rapidly, and their popularity became enormous.50
By any objective measure, the “Battle of Karameh” was more a rout than
an heroic “last stand.” In the terms of casualty metrics, Israel suffered 28 killed
and 90 wounded and, contrary to the assertions above, no IDF personnel were
captured. Four tanks and five other vehicles were destroyed and an aircraft was
brought down by Palestinian ground fire. Jordanian and Palestinian losses were
considerably higher. Sixty-one Jordanian soldiers lay dead with 108 more
wounded. Thirteen Jordanian tanks were completely destroyed, 20 more were
damaged, and 39 other vehicles were disabled. The guerrillas, however, sus-
tained the largest losses. Ninety-two Fatah guerrillas had been killed, in addition
to 24 other Palestinian fighters belonging either to the Popular Liberation Front
group or the Palestine Liberation Army. At least another 100 fedayeen were
wounded and more than 50 had been taken prisoner: a total, according to one
knowledgeable source, that “account[ed] for nearly half [the guerrilla’s] full-time
military personnel.”51 That the surviving fedayeen had escaped death, injury, or
capture was attributable entirely to the intervention of a Jordanian armored col-
umn and accompanying artillery support.52
Nonetheless, once the Fatah propaganda machine took over, this otherwise
inconsequential engagement and patent defeat was celebrated as an indisputably
heroic fedayeen triumph over the Zionist enemy. As Sayigh explained,
Israel had achieved its tactical objectives, but the battle of Karama
turned overnight into a resounding political and psychological victo-
ry in Arab eyes.  The Israelis had left behind some of their destroyed
armour, and several burnt-out tanks were paraded triumphantly
through the streets of Salt and Amman. The image of the invincible
IDF was shaken, appropriately, at Karama, Arabic for dignity. The
real credit was due to the Jordanian army, yet it was the guerrillas
whose reputation soared. Their decision to stand and fight, militarily
disastrous, catapulted them into a position of political pre-emin-
ence.53
Christopher Dobson, a British journalist who covered these same events and
whose book on this general subject was published only a few years later,
observed similarly how:
Immediately, the guerrillas ignoring their losses and the Jordanian
intervention, claimed a glorious victory. The news rang round the
Arab world and its effect was astonishing. The Arabs had lived on a
diet of defeat for so long it had seemed that no Arab force could
stand up to the Israeli army, and now, suddenly, they were told that a
small band armed only with grenades and assault rifles had defeated
a task force of Israeli tanks and planes. That this was not strictly true
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did not matter. The Battle of Karameh cannot be measured in strict-
ly military terms. It had demonstrated that the Israelis were not
invincible and it became a symbol of hope for the Arabs. . . . Arafat
and Fatah became heroes. Recruits  . . . weapons  . . . money poured
in.54
Even Israeli analysts concede this significant point. It demonstrated once
more how in insurgencies, government military victories can be expeditiously
vitiated and re-packaged by effective guerrilla information operations into com-
pelling propaganda, widely believed and fervently embraced, however com-
pletely divorced from reality. The battle of Karameh, Lorch explained,
was exploited to the full by Fatah propaganda. For a whole day they
had engaged considerable Israel army forces, and they had inflicted
considerable casualties. For the first time, an Israel tank was left
behind when the Israelis withdrew, a trophy which was publicized
throughout the Arab world. In Fatah’s struggle for recognition as a
military factor to be reckoned with, distorted versions of the battle of
Karameh, which made it seem that the Israeli withdrawal was forced
by the Arabs, rather than the original battle plan, henceforward
played an important point.55
Edward Luttwak and Dan Horowitz similarly recounted how,
Fatah claimed that it had succeeded in defeating the Israelis when all
Arab armies had failed; on the basis of this fabrication it launched a
successful fund-raising and propaganda campaign which portrayed
Fatah as the ‘wave of the future’ and the final arbiter of the Arab-
Israeli conflict  . . . [this] formed the basis of their prestige in Arab
(and non-Arab) eyes.56
Arafat himself moved swiftly to capitalize on this propaganda windfall. As
Fatah’s ranks began to swell with both new recruits and financial donations,57 he
sought to translate the group’s growing strength and prestige into the power nec-
essary to wrest control of the entire Palestinian liberation movement for himself
and Fatah. At the fifth session of the Palestine National Congress held in Cairo
in February 1969, he was elected chairman of the PLO’s executive committee
and immediately sought to consolidate Fatah’s dominant position by establish-
ing a joint PLO-Fatah military command.58 Arafat soon also acquired from the
rest of the Arab world recognition of the PLO as “the sole representative and
legitimate spokesman for the Palestinian people” and himself eventually
received what Paul Wilkinson described as the “ultimate accolade of a hero’s
welcome at the United Nations General Assembly” when he came to New York
to address that body in February 1974.59
As the Palestinian scholar Jamal R. Nassar explained, “Soon after
Karameh, Palestinian political culture became characterized by its admiration of
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the commandos. . . .   Palestinian literature, art, songs and media made the
Fedayeen into legendary heroes.”60 Indeed, within six years of Karameh, Arafat
had succeeded in overcoming a quarter-century of neglect and obscurity. He had
achieved what diplomats and statesmen, lobbyists and humanitarian workers had
persistently tried and failed to do: focus world attention on the Palestinian peo-
ple and their plight. Arafat and his fedayeen also provided a powerful example to
similarly frustrated ethnic and nationalist groups elsewhere: creating and foster-
ing a cult of the fedayeen that was imitated and emulated by national liberation
movements, guerrilla organizations, and terrorist groups alike in Latin America,
the Middle East, North America, and Europe. Indeed, by the 1980s, some 40 dif-
ferent insurgent and terrorist groups from these areas had come to PLO camps in
Jordan, Lebanon, and the Yemen among other places, for training. The
Palestinians’ purpose in this tutelary role was not entirely philanthropic. The for-
eign participants in these courses were reportedly charged between $5,000 and
$10,000 each for a six-week program of instruction. In addition, many of them
were later recruited to participate in joint operations alongside Palestinian ter-
rorists. Thus, according to Israeli defense sources, the PLO in 1981 had active
cooperative arrangements with some 22 different terrorist or insurgent organiza-
tions that all had sought to emulate the Palestinians’ asymmetric warfare style
and attendant “success.”61
The cult of the insurgent is thus arguably a heady intoxicant: leveling an
intrinsically uneven playing field between non-state actor and established nation-
state, and inspiring even the mostly lightly armed guerrilla to confront his or her
better armed conventional adversary. It creates an environment where guile
counts more than fire-power, and where the loosely organized insurgent network
can potentially stymie even the most well-oiled and superiorly organized war
machine. Indeed, its lessons are well understood by no less a towering figure than
Osama bin Laden himself.
The Cult of the Insurgent Today: bin Laden, al-Qaeda, and the Insurgency
in Iraq
For nearly a decade, bin Laden has also extolled the asymmetric virtues of
guerilla warfare. In his famous fatwa of 23 August 1996, titled, “Declaration of
War Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places: A
Message from Usama bin Muhammad bin Laden unto his Muslim Brethren All
Over the World Generally, and in the Arab Peninsula Specifically,” bin Laden
had argued, how, 
it must be obvious to you that, due to the imbalance of power
between our armed forces and the enemy forces, a suitable means of
fighting must be adopted i.e. using fast moving light forces that work
under complete secrecy. In other word to initiate a guerrilla warfare,
[we] the sons of the nation, and not the military forces, take part in
it.62
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Indeed, he has long credited such tactics with the victory that he claims his forces
achieved fighting alongside Somali militiamen against US forces in Mogadishu,
Somalia, during October 1993.  Those events, immortalized in the book and the
film Black Hawk Down, involved the death of 18 US Army Rangers and Delta
Force commandos at the hands of Somali militiamen and – allegedly – al-Qaeda
fighters.63 In bin Laden’s view it was precisely those losses that led to President
Clinton’s decision to withdraw American military forces from the relief effort in
Somalia, and thus proved that the only effective way to counter a superpower is
through terrorism and guerrilla warfare. Iraq arguably has provided him and his
followers with yet another opportunity.
Before the actual US/coalition invasion of Iraq in March 2003, that coun-
try had emerged as an important rallying cry for al-Qaeda and the radical jihadist
movement its purports to lead. The call to arms that al-Qaeda issued was not to
support Saddam Hussein or his regime but to resist what was and is still per-
ceived as continued US and Western aggression against Islam. This obligates all
Muslims everywhere to defend the faith from such aggression and encroachment.
In fact, although American officials from President Bush down often describe
Iraq as the “central front in the war on terror,” the idea of making Iraq the cen-
tral battlefield of jihad was first suggested by al-Qaeda itself.  In February 2003,
a month before the coalition invaded Iraq, al-Qaeda’s information department
released the fifth and sixth installments of a series of on-line articles, entitled In
the Shadow of the Lances, that had begun to appear shortly after the 9/11 attacks.
Although the previous installments had been written by al-Qaeda’s chief
spokesman, Sulamain Abu Ghaith, who had been trained as a theologian and
Muslim cleric, these two new issues were authored by Saif al-Adel,64 the group’s
chief of military operations. One of its most senior commanders and a warrior by
training, he had been an officer in the Egyptian Army’s Special Forces and a mil-
itary trainer at al-Qaeda’s al-Farouq camp in Afghanistan.65 In these issues, al-
Adel imparted practical advice to Iraqis and foreign jihadists on how guerrilla
warfare tactics could be used against the American and British troops. “Turn the
mujahedin military force into small units with good administrative capabilities,”
he suggested, “since this will spare us big losses. Large units pose management
problems,” al-Adl further explained. “They occupy large areas which are diffi-
cult to conceal from air reconnaissance and air attack.”66
Al-Qaeda’s entreaties to jihadists to descend on Iraq and confront the US
and coalition military forces only intensified after the fall of Baghdad. For exam-
ple, a statement posted on the movement’s al neda.com website on 9 April 2003,
which was clearly written after American forces had entered the Iraqi capital,
lauded the virtues of guerrilla warfare against conventional military opponents.
Under the heading “Guerrilla Warfare Is the most Powerful Weapon Muslims
have, and It is The Best Method to Continue the Conflict with the Crusader
Enemy,” various lessons of history were cited to rally jihadists for renewed bat-
tle. “With guerilla warfare,” it explained,
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the Americans were defeated in Vietnam and the Soviets were
defeated in Afghanistan.  This is the method that expelled the direct
Crusader colonialism from most of the Muslim lands, with Algeria
the most well known.  We still see how this method stopped Jewish
immigration to Palestine, and caused reverse immigration of Jews
from Palestine.  The successful attempts of dealing defeat to invaders
using guerilla warfare were many, and we will not expound on them.
However, these attempts have proven that the most effective method
for the materially weak against the strong is guerrilla warfare.67
The reference to the Soviets in Afghanistan and the linkage made to the US
in Vietnam is significant. Al-Qaeda propaganda repeatedly characterizes
America’s involvement in Iraq as a quagmire that will ultimately bring about its
downfall. It was repeated by bin Laden himself in the videotape broadcast on 29
October 2004, just before the US presidential election, when he explained, “So
we are continuing this policy in bleeding America to the point of bankruptcy.
Allah willing, and nothing is too great for Allah.”68 In al-Qaeda’s historical nar-
rative, clear parallels are drawn between the mujahideen’s defeat of the Red
Army in Afghanistan (which set in motion the alleged chain reaction that led to
the demise of the Soviet Union and communism) and the current travails facing
the US in Iraq and the inevitability of its defeat there at the hands of contempo-
rary jihadists. Indeed, al-Qaeda propaganda has long described the US as a
“paper tiger,”69 on the verge of financial ruin and total collapse, much as the
USSR once was, with the power of Islam poised similarly to push America over
the precipice.70
Bin Laden emphasized this very point in his last publicly known address to
his fighters in December 2001, when he declared that, “America is in retreat by
the grace of God Almighty and economic attrition is continuing up to today. But
it needs further blows. The young men need to seek out the nodes of the
American economy and strike the enemy’s nodes.”71 And, he repeated it again in
the aforementioned videotape released just days before the 2004 American pres-
idential elections. “This is in addition to our having experience in using guerril-
la warfare and the war of attrition to fight tyrannical superpowers, as we, along-
side the Mujahideen, bled Russia for ten years, until it went bankrupt and was
forced to withdraw in defeat. All Praise is due to Allah.”72 This strategy thus con-
tinues to guide and inform jihadist target selection and tactics today.
In fact, the clearest explication of al-Qaeda’s strategy in Iraq has been pro-
vided by bin Laden’s deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri. On the second anniversary of
the 9/11 attacks, he thanked God “for appeasing us with the dilemmas in Iraq and
Afghanistan. The Americans are facing a delicate situation in both countries. If
they withdraw they will lose everything and if they stay, they will continue to
bleed to death.”73 On 9/11’s third anniversary, he issued a slightly different ver-
sion of the same statement, now proclaiming that US defeat in Iraq and
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Afghanistan “has become just a question of time. . . . The Americans in both
countries are between two fires,” Zawahiri explained.  “[I]f they continue, they
will bleed until death, and if they withdraw, they will lose everything.”74
Indeed, what US military commanders optimistically described in late
2003 as the jihadist “magnet” or terrorist “flytrap” orchestrated by the US inva-
sion of Iraq is thus viewed very differently by al-Qaeda. “Two years after Tora
Bora,” al-Zawahiri observed in December 2003, “the American bloodshed [has]
started to increase in Iraq and the Americans are unable to defend themselves.”75
For al-Qaeda, accordingly, Iraq has likely been an effective means to preoccupy
American military forces and also distract US attention while al-Qaeda and its
confederates make new inroads and strike elsewhere.  On a personal level, it may
have also provided bin Laden and al-Zawahiri with the breathing space that they
desperately needed to further obfuscate their trail. But most importantly, Iraq has
figured prominently in al-Qaeda and jihadist plans and propaganda as a means
of reinvigorating the jihadist cause and sustaining its momentum as well as
engaging US forces in battle. It thus perpetuates the image of Islam as being cast
perpetually on the defensive with no alternative but to take up arms against
American and Western aggressors. In addition, the ongoing violence in Iraq, cou-
pled with the inability of US and coalition and Iraqi security forces to maintain
order, the Abu Ghraib revelations, and other disadvantageous developments,
have all doubtless contributed to America’s poor standing in the Muslim world.
By effectively engaging US military forces in Iraq and inflicting upon them a
degree of pain and suffering on a magnitude that Saddam Hussein’s convention-
al forces were incapable of doing, the cult of the insurgent has also been perpet-
uated. Potentially, it will inspire imitation and succession elsewhere, much as the
cult of the fedayeen did almost 40 years ago.
CONCLUSION
In the future America’s adversaries may, therefore, conclude that the only
effective means to confront either a superpower or the superior, conventional
military forces of an established nation-state is through a campaign reliant on ter-
rorist and insurgent tactics.  The attendant implications for US security and how
the American military plans and prepares to meet future contingencies and chal-
lenges are potentially profound given the possibility that a new era of sub-nation-
al conflict and non-state violence may yet be on the horizon: an era even blood-
ier and more destructive than today.
Bruce Hoffman is a Professor in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown
University.
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